

## *Features of British Indigo in India*

PRIOR to the British dominance in Bengal, indigo was cultivated and processed primarily in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Lahore, Oudh and Agra. The dye was consumed domestically, and was exported in early times to the Roman Empire and Europe. The export of indigo dye from India expanded during the sixteenth and early seventeenth century when Indian indigo attracted European traders. The contraction of Indian indigo export during the late seventeenth century has been attributed to the competition from West Indian indigo; the latter is presumed to have been produced by a superior technology.<sup>1</sup>

Around 1780's, along with the British dominance in Bengal, the following situation existed: 1) The East India Company, its servants and private British traders were eager to develop a regular means of remittance to transfer their wealth and pay for imports, 2) Only a primary commodity could be exported because the export of manufactured goods from India elicited resistance from British manufacturers. 3) Although Bengal opium was exported to China to pay for British tea imports, no other primary commodity produced in Bengal was suitable for remittance. This was either because of the domestic scarcity or the international price disadvantage of such commodities. 4) West Indian planters had switched from indigo to more profitable coffee and sugar. 5) The supply of indigo from other sources such as America and Guatemala was uncertain due to the prevailing hostilities. 6) The demand for indigo was rising in Europe both due to fashion as well as increased warfare.

Under these conditions, the export of indigo from India was an obvious choice for the British. A not-so-obvious British policy however was to promote British plantation in Bengal and Bihar, the two provinces which had practically no prior experience in the commercial production of indigo.<sup>2</sup> Another aspect of the same policy was to discriminate against upper Indian (UI) indigo pro-

duced at the traditional centres of production cited earlier. A major decision was taken by the Court of Directors in 1800 to impose a transit duty of 15 percent on UI indigo. The British planters in Bengal and Bihar demanded this tariff protection on the grounds that indigo, being new in Bengal and Bihar, necessitated a larger investment and operating costs and the inferior quality of UI indigo would destroy the reputation of Indian indigo in the world market. The Bengal Board of Trade, on the other hand, maintained that the long-term survival of indigo would be possible only if UI indigo was not discriminated against and the market was allowed to decide a price and quantity for every quality of indigo. The court however ruled against the free market in favour of protection. There were many other ways other than tariff protection in which the administration supported British plantations, as will be seen in the course of this paper. The support continued throughout the period during which British plantations existed, that is, until the 1910's.

### *Differences between the British and Upper Indian Systems*

Let us first examine the relative strength of British and UI indigo as it was displayed in the market. Half a century after the tariff discrimination was imposed on UI indigo, between 1849 and 1859, the expansion of British indigo was at its peak. Even during this period, Doab and Banaras continued to supply about 25 percent of the exported indigo (see Table 1). From this performance of UI indigo, it is clear that British indigo did not have any cost advantage. One can thus conclude that the UI system was fully

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF THE OUT-TURN OF INDIGO IN BENGAL PRESIDENCY,  
BY THE REGION OF ORIGIN DURING 1849-59

Year	Doab and Banaras (i)	Tirhut district (ii)	All Bihar districts (ii)	Percentage	
				All Bengal districts (iii)	Total (i) + (ii) + (iii)
49-50	19.3	19.1	28.4	52.2	100
50-51	18.5	24.2	33.2	48.3	100
51-52	28.6	14.6	23.8	47.6	100
52-53	30.2	20.4	30.9	38.9	100
53-54	35.7	17.5	25.0	39.3	100
54-55	20.5	25.7	36.1	43.4	100
55-56	31.0	17.3	28.7	40.3	100
56-57	7.2	25.3	39.0	53.8	100
57-58	18.8	21.9	30.2	51.0	100
58-59	24.5	25.2	37.8	37.8	100

SOURCE: The Report of Indigo Commission Appointed under Act XI of 1860, British, Parliamentary Papers, Vol XLIV, 1861, Appendix 17.

capable of producing indigo for remittance, if remittance was the sole concern.

This leads us to examine the differences in the technology and the organization of production between the UI and British systems. It is generally argued that the British introduced new machinery and managerial expertise.<sup>3</sup> In particular, the government support to British planters was justified on the basis that West Indian technology was superior to native technology and that British plantations would emulate this superior technology. No evidence exists however that British hardware was superior to UI hardware.<sup>4</sup>

There were significant differences, on the other hand, in the organization of production between the two systems. In Agra, individual cultivators produced indigo, and used some degree of cooperation at village level for the extraction of the dye. In Gujarat, cultivation was mostly done by individual farmers, and dye was extracted by middlemen who also marketed the final product.<sup>5</sup> The scale of operation was small both in the case of peasants extracting dye collectively or middlemen extracting dye after purchasing indigo plants from cultivators. No evidence exists that any coercion was used by the parties involved in the UI system.

British plantations, on the other hand, operated on a large scale.<sup>6</sup> In fact, these were the first large organizations to operate in rural India which were not military or religious in nature. Each plantation had a large number of permanent employees, godowns, factory establishments, and recurring expenditure on managers' comfort.<sup>7</sup> All this meant commitment to large overheads. Their mode of operation was characterized by a routine use of coercion, on which there is no dearth of evidence.<sup>8</sup> The legal relationship between planters and cultivators differed across regions, and even within a region, depending on whether the cultivator was a tenant of the factory, or bound by a lease, or a wage labourer; and whether the land was owned by the factory or leased by the factory from a landlord. Regardless of these differences, the planter employed coercion to impose indigo on cultivators and to keep them bound to the system as long as possible. Legal and illegal forces were used for plainly exploitative purposes, such as 1) to extract the best land and labour for indigo; 2) to pay the lowest possible price for output; 3) to impose all risks of crop failure on the cultivator; 4) to invoke assumed *zamindari* (landlord's) rights for underpaying or not paying cultivators for supporting services; 5) to use improper measuring and weighting systems for land and

produce; 6) to impose *ahbabs* (customary payments)<sup>9</sup> on cultivators and 7) to extract *dasturi* (bribes) for factory servants. For the first time in Indian agrarian history, the choice of cropping pattern was taken away from cultivators on such a widespread scale. The economics clearly worked against the cultivators.<sup>10</sup>

In order to examine the dynamics of the British system, it is necessary to analyse the relations between plantations and other participants, such as the administration and Indian landlords. It is seen in the following sections that these relations were simultaneously cooperative and antagonistic.

### *Planters and Administration*

The administration's policy towards British planters can be seen as both consistent and vacillating over time. The basic policy of exploiting a primary commodity through imperial powers remained unchanged throughout the period from 1780 until 1915 when exogenous forces were driving indigo out of the market. Within this basic framework, however, the British policy displayed a multilevel schizophrenia between protection and competition, mercantile adventurism and administrative caution, and long-term aims and short-term expediency. Not only did the tactical policies vacillate over time, but they often contradicted one another. The interests of the administration and planters directly conflicted at times when the rural unrest resulting from planters' exploitation reached a critical point of jeopardizing the British order.

After granting the initial tariff protection to British indigo, the administration discontinued financial advances to planters in 1802. This was done with a view to encourage competition, but advances were quickly resumed under pressure from planters. The UI indigo continued to be discriminated against all along, even after complete British control over the region which produced this indigo. This discrimination was with full knowledge of the competitive advantage of UI indigo; a situation which is similar to the discrimination against Malwa opium which had its own disastrous consequences on the British opium trade. The agency houses and other financial institutions involved in indigo trade were supported in very much a stop and go manner with frequent changes in the rules of the game.

The implementation of policies at the grass-root level often varied from the expression of policies in Calcutta because of the different interpretations given by British administrators at different levels from Calcutta to the districts. There were obvious reasons for such interpretations to be strongly biased in favour of

planters. In the initial years, the Company servants were allowed to trade in indigo for both speculative and remittance purposes. Although the direct participation of the Company servants in trade was severely restricted by Cornwallis, the pecuniary interests of the servants remained strongly linked to the large business houses in Calcutta until the late nineteenth century. In turn, the profitability of many of these houses was dependent on the extent of protection and licence given to British indigo planters in rural areas. Also, planter-administrator communication was far easier than cultivator-administrator communication, given racial bias and social interaction. During civil crises, the administration not only trusted planters but endowed them with magisterial powers.

The brutalities of the British indigo system were very much evident in its formative years, as early as 1796, and the cultivators misery and resistance were common since the early nineteenth century.<sup>11</sup> The basic economics of the British system however was never questioned, and alibis were found elsewhere. Planters blamed the administration for insufficient financial support and for the law prohibiting planters from owning land. They blamed Indian landlords for their non-cooperation and wickedness. The administration often traced indigo problems to the fickleness of the farmers' minds. Incidentally, the administration also proposed a social engineering point of view, that the problems of indigo would be solved if cultivators internalized the importance of indigo to the British Empire. Whenever feasible, the administration found ways of responding to planters' demands. The Charter Act of 1833 granted planters the right to own land. A strong intervention from Calcutta came only in 1857-1861 when planter-cultivator conflict in Bengal reached an explosive state. Act X restricted the rights of landlords and planters. The instantaneous opposition of planters to Act X led to a ruthless use of Act XI of 1860 which made cultivators completely vulnerable to planters through legal procedure. Only when the resulting resistance of cultivators in Bengal was even more violent, and threatened the British order, was it proclaimed at the end of 1860 that growing of indigo could not be imposed against the will of the cultivators.

Though this proclamation precipitated the rapid decline of Bengal indigo, the British administration was careful to ensure that the indigo system in Bihar remained insulated from the events in Bengal. The resistance in Bihar, whenever it occurred, was treated merely as a law and order problem, in a manner similar to the pre-1859 treatment of Bengal resistance.

The usual assertion that legal protection was extended to

rural India by the British fails to be substantiated in the present case. The local courts had no jurisdiction over the British for a long time. The courts which controlled the British were too far away. The legal system was too alien and expensive for peasants. The grass root administration and police effectively prevented cultivators from approaching higher authorities. In those rare cases of planter-cultivator conflict which reached to the level of a court hearing, verdict was almost always in favour of planters. Above all, the higher authorities approved of the entire system as long as it did not produce any major rural unrest.

### *Landlords and Other Indian Participants*

The participation of Indian landlords in Bihar and Bengal indigo was varied and ambivalent. Often, landlords' and planters' interests conflicted because planters tended to assume *zamindari* rights which did not leave much surplus for landlords. On the other hand, planter-landlord interests coincided in situations in which landlords could obtain larger land revenue by leasing land to planters who would then do the dirty job of recovering high rents. It could be surmised that collaboration with planters was easier for big landlords than it was for small landlords. Big landlords usually dealt with their tenants in a more organized and impersonal way, through a hierarchy of assistants, which facilitated a greater indifference towards the problems of tenants.

The cooperation from landlords was necessary for a profitable operation of indigo enterprises regardless of the nature of contract between cultivators and planters. Such cooperation however was more essential if cultivators were wage labourers working on the land leased to the factory. In this system called *niz* in Bengal and *zeerat* in Bihar, tenants were evicted from their hereditary land and then routinely forced to work as wage labourers.

There was a clear absence of Indians as planters. The only notable exception was D N Tagore who directly owned and exercised influence over the factories linked to his financial enterprise. Tagore however cannot be classified as non-British, especially in the context of his business operations. He employed British plantation managers and exercised sufficient influence over the bureaucracy.<sup>12</sup>

A large number of Indians participated in British plantations as subordinates employed in administration, production and police activities. The Indian employees at higher ranks received a salary plus a commission on revenue, while the lower rank employees received only a fixed salary. At all ranks however, their earn-

ings were augmented by extracting bribes in return for their leniency to cultivators.<sup>13</sup> The power of petty officialdom to abuse peasants who have no resources and no access to law can be considerable. The widespread presence of such pure parasites at grass-root levels has been a common feature in India, in one form or another, at least since the Mughal times.<sup>14</sup> One could thus say that British planters merely adopted an administrative style which had already been successful when their purpose was to exploit the countryside.

### *Differences between Bengal and Bihar*

After the Bengal crisis of 1860, the entire British indigo system moved to Bihar where it expanded until as late as 1880.<sup>15</sup> Even before the Bengal crisis, the production of indigo in Bihar was comparable to that in Bengal. During 1849-59, about 31 percent of the total outturn of indigo in Bengal Presidency came from Bihar, compared to 44 percent from Bengal itself (see Table I). Though the earliest reports of planters' brutalities came from Bihar, there was no significant organized resistance to planters until 1867—ten years after the Bengal crisis—when a localized conflict occurred in Champaran. In fact, it was possible for Bihar planters to contain large scale unrest until 1907.<sup>16</sup> By then, indigo dye was being forced out of the world market by the synthetic dye and indigo demand was falling except for a brief pickup during the first World War. The last of the indigo planters in Bihar imposed exorbitant rents, which produced serious discontent. This along with the rising national movement, brought Mahatma Gandhi to Champaran in 1917 to deliver the death blow to this infamous system. But at that stage indigo was dying a natural death, and Gandhi's intervention was only symbolic in an economic sense.

Thus a large scale opposition to British indigo emerged in Bihar about half a century after it had occurred and successfully achieved its results in Bengal. The system in Bihar was probably more burdensome to cultivators when compared to Bengal.<sup>17</sup> Further, the anti-Raj feelings were more prevalent during that period in Bihar as they surfaced in the 1857 uprising. Some of the possible reasons behind the relative calm in Bihar indigo plantations could be as follows:

- 1) In Bihar, British indigo was concentrated only in a few regions. The production of indigo in Bengal was relatively less concentrated. During 1850's, Bengal's production of indigo was about 30 percent more than Bihar's production (see Table I.) Most of the

indigo in Bihar came from only five districts whereas 14 districts in Bengal produced significant quantities of indigo. The Tirhut region in Bihar alone produced 30,000 maunds in certain years. In contrast, the output of Jessore, the Bengal district with the largest output, never exceeded 17,000 maunds in any year during the 1850's.<sup>18</sup> Within the limitations of data, one could thus say that the geographical concentration of indigo in Bihar was more than that in Bengal. Following from this, it can be hypothesized that the spatial concentration in Bihar enabled planters to organize support from the administration and landlords more cohesively.

2) Evidence exists that many of the Bihar plantations were on land leased from big landlords. Almost all indigo plantations in Champaran, for example, were on land leased from just two landlords. Also, as late as 1876, permanent lease of 95,970 *bighas*<sup>19</sup> was granted by the Bettiah landlord to British planters for establishing 21 indigo factories.<sup>20</sup> In other words, large landlords participated frequently in the indigo system in Bihar. As the interests of big landlords were more in harmony with the interests of planters—the reason for which we have advanced earlier—there was possibly greater day-to-day landlord support in Bihar. The same is reflected in the fact that the *zeerat* system was more predominant in Bihar than the corresponding *niz* system was in Bengal.<sup>21</sup> This system, as explained earlier, required more landlords' support than any other system. The differences in the extent of collaboration of landlords with planters between Bihar and Bengal can also be seen from the observation that while several Bengal landlords voiced their opposition to the British system, Bihar landlords played less than a passive role.

3) Finally, the events in Bengal were to a certain degree influenced by the Catholic liberal press and Bengal intelligentsia, which were far removed from the Gangetic plains of Bihar.

### *Some Hypotheses*

Before presenting the picture of British indigo that emerges from this paper, we will examine some of the hypotheses advanced. Only the first one of these directly refers to indigo. Others are more general statements on the process of economic change, but it would be worthwhile to relate them to the experience of British indigo in India.

One of the main explanations given for the failure of the British indigo system is that the market information was uncertain and a time lag and discrepancy existed between demand and



supply.<sup>23</sup> It is not unsafe to assert that the information constraints faced by UI producers and traders were no less, and probably much more, than those faced by British planters. The upper Indian systems had faced large fluctuations in indigo prices in much earlier times,<sup>23</sup> and continued to do so during the British period. However, we have no evidence that any breakdown of the system occurred in upper India. Thus, the performance of the British system cannot be attributed to the nature of the market.

Max Weber's formal view that native values acted as impediments to economic growth in India is clearly unsustainable in the case of indigo. A viable system of indigo production existed in upper India which, apart from being based on native values, was fully capable of responding to export needs. Further, this system remained viable despite official discrimination by a system which was based on more western motivations.

### *Alternative Hypothesis*

An alternative hypothesis has been proposed more recently<sup>24</sup> to explain the nature of economic change in India. According to this hypothesis, most investment decisions were made by entrepreneurs within the framework of official policy, local values and social structure. These individuals maximized their pecuniary gains, given the different information advantage each of them had. Loosely stated, a general equilibrium system operated with information and uncertainty differences across groups. This hypothesis however becomes too general to be meaningful if it permits total official control and yet implies a free market. But if that is not the case, then the crucial part of the hypothesis does not hold for indigo. More precisely, while there is no reason to dispute the maximizing behaviour of Indian farmers, now or in the nineteenth century, it would, be unenlightened generosity to say that the constraints imposed on farmers were generated by the market, if a market existed at all. It would be equally wrong to believe that differences in market information resulted in Indians not becoming indigo planters. In fact, not a trace of free enterprise can be found in the British system. "Free trade", "opening up of internal trade", "introduction of expertise and new machinery"<sup>25</sup> by the British in Bengal and Bihar can be considered as pure myths, at least as far as indigo is concerned.

The experience of indigo in India provides an interesting corroboration of the hypothesis proposed by Gunder Frank.<sup>26</sup> The thrust of his hypothesis with some simplification, is as follows: 1) A hierarchy composed of world metropolis, nation metropolis,

provincial and local metropolis, rural hinterland, was imposed in the process of colonization; 2) each higher level developed relative to the lower level and each lower level underdeveloped relative to the higher level (the cumulative burden fell on the peasantry); 3) in the process, the national metropolis acquired traits of development which were neither self-generating nor self-sustaining; and 4) the lower levels of the hierarchy were left to develop their underdevelopment when the metropolis-satellite relationship ceased to exist for various exogenous and endogenous reasons.

It is well known that Bengal and Bihar were the first two provinces where the British influence was consolidated. Very quickly after the British supremacy in Bengal, British commercial interests and administration were extensively visible in rural Bengal and Bihar. Calcutta rapidly expanded and became the hub of industry, trade and commerce. It remained so throughout the British period, and later. In the process, Calcutta acquired all the observable traits of development such as modern institutions, technology, urbanization and education. A large part of industrial capital in India was located in Calcutta and at other industrial locations in Bengal and Bihar. What has been the relative performance of Bengal and Bihar in the post-independence period compared to other states? Not bright, given their resources—so indicate the studies which have examined the relative performance of states in India.<sup>27</sup> These two states have a large proportion of India's natural wealth, and have had a large proportion of industrial and other capital. Yet their performance in general has lagged behind average performance in India. Also, these two states display more striking disparities in their income distribution than the average inequality in India.

### *An Explanation and Concluding Remarks*

We shall explore two sets of reasons for the performance of the British indigo system: 1) the nature of organizations created by the British was entirely unsuitable for indigo and 2) any other kind of organization would not have satisfied the expectations and the mode of operation of the imperial British. The catch contained in these two seems to explain a large part of the failure of the British indigo system as well as the misery it created.

The British system was characterized by economies of scale, vertical integration, financial integration, market intelligence, and financial support from the government. Also, the help from landlords and administration enabled British planters to exercise monopsonist power over the main inputs of production, namely, labour

and land. The very same feature also entailed large fixed investments and recurring overheads, which were sizable.

Indigo on the other hand was a crop with many uncertainties. Weather variability resulted in different yields across years. Indigo plant was more than normally sensitive to the care and timeliness of plant husbandry. Fluctuations in London prices were not determined by the demand and supply conditions and there was a time lag in information between London and Calcutta. But most critically, British plantations were dealing in just one uncertain commodity. Their risks, thus, were strongly concentrated.

On the basis of available information it is reasonable to say that cultivators and traders in upper India did not deal in indigo alone. The small size of establishment and the absence of recurring overheads made it possible for the participants in the UI system to adjust the level of their operations to suit the changing exogenous conditions without incurring losses.

At the same time, the scale of gains that motivated individual UI traders or cultivators was far smaller than what motivated the British. The British were in India to make fortunes commensurate with their status of being the ruling class. It was thus obvious for the British to prefer large organizations, which could only produce large gains, no matter what the cost to the peasantry.

The size and nature of British organizations being inherently unsuitable for a crop like indigo, coercion was employed to maintain profitability. The government sanctioned coercion for several reasons, such as the large resources of each of the British plantations, the ease with which planters' alliances could be formed to counter any policy adverse to them, racial preference, and the dependence of the government on indigo. It was therefore possible for British plantations to seek surplus from excesses on the peasantry rather than from productivity and efficiency. The dynamic impact of coercion was at least three-fold, each necessitating further excesses to maintain profitability.

Firstly, the complete alienation and lack of involvement of the peasantry in a sensitive crop like indigo clearly reduced their productivity. Secondly, the instrument of coercion, namely the para-police maintained by planters and the para-legal support from the administration, itself involved expenditures. Thirdly, the mode of operation of British plantations enabled their employees to seek gains for themselves, and their gains were not coincidental with the gains of the organization. The rampant practice of bribery

and customary payments at all levels of plantation hierarchy is an example of these gains.

Thus, the nature of the British organization contained the mechanics of increasing coercion over time. In the interest of the continuation of the British order, however, the administration could support coercion only to that degree of unfairness, peasants' reaction to which could be contained by the law and order machinery. In other words, the empire intervened and removed some tyranny when the level of rural unrest became critical. The system however remained basically unchanged until it met its demise as a result of technological substitution.

The case of British indigo in India seems to be one in which, in the haste and expediency of empire making, an economically unsustainable chain was forged and imposed on the peasantry in Bihar and Bengal. In the process, organizational forms were created with their own dynamics of growth and survival requiring increasing dependence on exploitation and decreasing dependence on fair economic relationships. As a more general comment, we could say that concepts such as "economies of scale", "vertical integration", "financial integration" (which pervade the prevailing economic thought) can acquire a very different meaning if the power relations differ sharply across groups of people. Large organizations, with vastly unequal relationships among different participants, can work precisely against the professed goals of these organizations, such as productivity and efficiency. This phenomenon is not uncommon in most of today's world.

<sup>1</sup> B B Kling, *The Blue Mutiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal 1859-1862*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966, P 17. But whether native indigo suffered from inferior technology or from higher freight charges and wasteful shipping practices of the company has not been examined so far. For some of the inefficiencies of this particular monopoly, see, P J Marshall, *Problems of Empire: Britain and India 1757-1813*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1968, p 88.

<sup>2</sup> Often it is implicitly assumed that the commercial production of indigo was widespread in Bihar and Bengal even in the pre-British times (P J Marshall *East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1976, p 153). From both Mughal and British sources however it is clear that the commercial production of indigo was at best marginal in these two provinces prior to the establishment of British plantations. See, Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System in Mughal India, 1556-1707*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1968, pp 42-43; H K Naqwi, *Urban Centres and Industries in Upper India*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1968, pp 54-59; and B Chowdhury, *Growth of Commercial Agriculture in Bengal 1757-1900*, Vol 1, India Studies: Past and Present, Calcutta, 1964, p 76.

<sup>3</sup> Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes*, *op cit*, p 157.

<sup>4</sup> Habib, *op cit*, p 59.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, p 59.

<sup>6</sup> B Chowdhury, *op cit*, p 83.

- <sup>7</sup> For a vivid account of the extravagance and lavishness of Indigo planters, see, C Grant, *Rural Life in Bengal*, London, W Thaker, 1860.
- <sup>8</sup> *The Report of Indigo Commission*, appointed under Act XI of 1860, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol XLIV, 186p; L S O'Malley, *Champaran*, Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers, Superintendent, Government Printing, Bihar, Patna, 1938; and B B Kling, *The Blue Mutiny*, *op cit.*
- <sup>9</sup> Two of the numerous *ahbabs* are cited here for illustration: Motarahi Rs 1 per tenant as a compensation for the pride which the tenant must be deriving because their planter owned a carriage or car. 'Phagunahi'-Rs 1 per tenant every year because tenants enjoyed the colourful *Holi* festival which their planter did not participate in. See PC Roy Chaudhury, *Champaran*, Bihar District Gazetteers, Superintendent, Secretariat Press, Bihar, Patna, 1960.
- <sup>10</sup> On the basis of the data contained in the *Report of Indigo Commission*, *op cit.*, the average loss to an indigo cultivator was Rs 9 to Rs 11 per bigha if his labour was valued at the prevailing market rate. Also see, Kling, *The Blue Mutiny*, *op cit.*
- <sup>11</sup> N K., Sinha, *The Economic History of Bengal*, Calcutta, Firma K L Mukhopadhyay, 1961, pp. 209-210; and Chowdhury, *op cit.*
- <sup>12</sup> Kling, B B, *Partner in Empire: Dwarkanath Tagore and the Age of Enterprise in India*, University of California Press, 1976, pp. 86-87.
- <sup>13</sup> Kling, *The Blue Mutiny*, *op cit.*
- <sup>14</sup> Habib, *op cit.*, pp 129-135, pp 295-297, also some other parts of this book.
- <sup>15</sup> O' Malley, *op cit.*, p 78.
- <sup>16</sup> O' Malley, L S *op cit.*
- <sup>17</sup> Evidence to the Agrarian Committee, mentioned in Roy Chaudhury, P C, *op cit.*
- <sup>18</sup> *The Report of Indigo Commission op cit.*, Appendix 17.
- <sup>19</sup> One *bigha* is about one quarter of a hectare.
- <sup>20</sup> O' Malley, *op cit.*
- <sup>21</sup> Chowdhury, *op cit.*, pp. 125-126.
- <sup>22</sup> Chowdhury, *op cit.*, p. 192; and Kling, *The Blue Mutiny*, *op cit.*, p 19.
- <sup>23</sup> Habib, *op cit.*, pp 86-88.
- <sup>24</sup> See, M D Morris, *South Asian Entrepreneurship and the Rashomon Effect*, mimeo, for a well articulated statement of this hypothesis.
- <sup>25</sup> See, Marshall, *East Indian Fortunes*, *op cit.*, for a recent statement of this line of thought.
- <sup>26</sup> A G Frank, *On Capitalist Underdevelopment*, Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1975; A G, Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", *Monthly Review*, September 1966.
- <sup>27</sup> K N Raj, "Growth and Stagnation in Indian Industrial Development", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, February 1976; and T Singh, *India's Development Experience*, Delhi, Macmillan, 1974.